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Part III: Companions on the Way: 
The Necessity of Friendship 
IN THE BEGINNING WAS FRIENDSHIP 
I began by suggesting that happiness, the life of virtue, and friendship were 
inextricably interrelated. We cannot understand the kind of happiness that we 
should desire without understanding the life of virtue, but the life of virtue, as we 
shall see, finally requires an account of friendship. Further, friendship turns out 
to be essential for illuminating any happiness worth having. Indeed I have argued 
this interrelation is but an indication of why any adequate account of the moral 
life inherently entails a sense of the temporal character of our existence. To un-
derstand and, more importantly, to live a life of virtue and happiness requires 
our willingness to undertake a journey that is as interesting as it is demanding. 
That it is such means friendship is required not only to understand the nature of 
the journey but to sustain us on the way. 
I could as well have begun these articles by undertaking an analysis of friend-
ship rather than happiness. In many ways that might have been preferable. Hap-
piness suggests that the moral life is finally a matter of individual achievement 
and effort. Even the attempt lo construe our desire for happiness in terms of a 
journey tends to underwrite this assumption, since we tend to associate accounts 
of journeys with heroic endeavors of an individual. 
Thus Aristotle says at the beginning of Book VII, 
Continuing in a sequence, the next subject which we shall have to 
discuss is friendship. For it is some sort of excellence or virtue, or 
involves virtue, and it is, moreover, most indispensable for life. No one 
would choose lo live without friends, even if he had all other goods. 
Rich men and those who hold office and power are, above all others, 
regarded as requiring friends. For what good would their prosperity do 
them if it did not provide them with the opportunity for good works? 
And the best works done and those which deserve the highest praise are 
those that are done to one's friends {1155al-10). 
As we shall see, this assertion but scratches the surface of Aristotle's account 
of friendship. Just as Aristotle led us to see that the life of virtue is not simply a 
"means" to happiness, neither are friends incidental to the happy life. Rather 
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friendship is intrinsic to our ability to live well, an activity crucial to the very 
meaning and nature of happiness. Thus in a summary passage Aristotle says, 
We stated at the beginning that happiness is some kind of activity, and 
activity clearly is something that comes into being and not something we 
can take for granted like a piece of property. From the propositions: (1) 
being happy consists in liking and in being active, and as we stated at the 
beginning, the activity of a good man is in itself good and pleasant; (2) 
what is our own is a pleasant thing to us; (3) we are better able to 
observe our neighbors than ourselves,and their actions better than our 
own; and ( 4) the actions of persons who have a high moral standard are 
pleasant to those good men who are their friends, in that they possess 
both qualities which are pleasant by nature (i.e., they are good and they 
are their own); it follows that a supremely happy man wilJ need friends 
of this kind. His moral purpose or choice is to observe actions which are 
good and which are his own, and such are the actions of a good man 
who is his friend (1169b28-1170a3). 
It is no wonder, therefore, that Aristotle spent two books of the Ethics on the 
subject of friendship. That he did so is in marked contrast with contemporary 
ethics where the question of friendship and its character is as overlooked as the 
analysis of the virtues.1 We may think that happiness has some relation to ques-
tions of morality, but we seldom think an account of happiness requires such an 
extensive analysis of friendship. For Aristotle the exact opposite is the case. As 
we have seen, he believed a certain kind of self-knowledge, a practical wisdom, is 
necessary for the happy life. Without friendship, however, such knowledge is im-
possible. As John Cooper has pointed out, the person of character can come to 
know his own character only by studying that of his friend. 
The presumption is that even an intimate friend remains distinct enough 
to be studied objectively; yet because one intuitively knows oneself to be 
fundamentally the same character as he is, one obtains through him an 
objective view of oneself. One recogriizes the quality of one's own 
character and one's own life by seeing it reflected, as in a mirror, in 
one's friend.2 
But to see why this is the case we must look more closely at Aristotle's analysis 
of " true friendship." 
ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP 
Aristotle begins his account by distinguishing between three different kinds of 
friendship which correspond to three types of affection--useful, pleasant and per-
fect friendship. 
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In each of these the affection can be reciprocated so that the partner is 
aware of it, and the partners wish for each other's good in terms of the 
motive on which their affection is based. Now when the motive of the 
affection is usefulness, the partners do not feel affection for one another 
per-se but in terms of the good accruing to each from the other. The 
same is also true of those whose friendship is based on pleasure: we 
love witty people, not for what they are, but for the pleasure they give 
us. (Thus in these kinds of friendships) the friend is loved not because 
he is a friend, but because he is useful or pleasant. Thus, these two 
kinds are friendship only incidentally, since the object of affection is not 
loved for being the kind of person he is, but for providing some good or 
pleasure. Consequently, such friendships are easily dissolved when the 
partners do not remain unchanged: the affection ceases as soon as one 
partner is no longer pleasant or useful to the other (1156a9-20). 
In contrast, perfect or true friendship is that "between good men who are like 
in excellence or virtue. For these friends wish alike for one another's good be-
cause they are good men, and they are good per-se (that is, their goodness is 
something intrinsic, not incidental)" (1156b5-10). Only this kind of friendship 
can be called such properly since the friendship is not based on incidental con-
siderations and therefore is lasting. Just as the acts that appear virtuous are such 
only as they contribute to the life of one who has a firm and unchangeable char-
acter, so friendship is possible only to those whose life is not subject to change 
by good or bad fortune. Only such people are capable of friendship without 
qualification, "for in this kind of friendship the partners are like one another, 
and the other objects worthy of affection--the unqualified good and the unquali-
fied pleasant--are also found in it, and these are the highest objects of affection" 
(1156b23-25). 
It is important to note that Aristotle does not suggest that there are three 
kinds of friendship, for in the "primary and proper sense of the word, we call 
'friendship' that which exists between good men as good men" (1156b31). 
Friendships of pleasure and use are called such only by analogy. For while they 
"bear some resemblance" to true friendship, they lack the essential characteris-
tics necessary to genuine friendship. Thus it is impossible for bad people to be 
friends on the basis of pleasure and usefulness, but only good men can be friends 
based on what they are since only they are capable of finding joy in one another 
(1157a16-20). 
Recently some have suggested that Aristotle has overstated his case insofar as 
well-wishing is a characteristic common to all forms of friendship. Unless friend-
;hip is construed in this larger sense it would seem that ordinary people, with the 
1ormal mixture of some good and some bad qualities of character, are not eli-
9ble to be friends.3 Even more disturbing if rigorously pressed, Aristotle's ac-
:ount of true friendship makes one wonder if true friendship has or can ever ex-
st. 
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While interesting in itself, the question of how to resolve how friendship of 
use and pleasure may be related to true friendship is not of immediate interest in 
terms of the issues before us. However, the issue of whether true friendship is a 
real possibility cannot be avoided. For unless true friendship is a possibility, 
Aristotle's whole account of the moral life risks becoming an idealistic abstrac-
tion. Moreover, I think by pressing the issue we will be able to see why Aris-
totle's account of the life of virtue entails a sense of journey. 
Aristotle certainly never seems to imply that true friendship is an impossibil-
ity, though he does not think it common. That such is the case is not simply due 
to our limitations as virtuous agents, but also because of the very character of 
friendship. "To be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is 
impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many at the same time. For 
love is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique. It does not easily 
happen that one man finds many people very pleasing at the same time, nor per-
haps does it easily happen that there are many people who are good. Also, one 
must have some experience of the other person and have come to be familiar 
with him, and that is the hardest thing of all. But it is possible to please many 
people on the basis of usefulness and pleasantness, since many have these quali-
ties, and the services they have to offer do not take a long time" (1158a10-18). 
Thus, if friendship is based on virtue and the character of our friends, it is im-
possible to be a friend of many people. Rather "we must be content if we find 
even a few friends of this kind" (1171a17-20). 
What then are we to make of Aristotle's claim that "friendship seems to hold 
states together" so that lawgivers even devote more attention to it than justice 
(1155a22). Indeed he goes further and observes that different forms of constitu-
tions enhance different forms of friendships so that perverted forms of constitu-
tions decrease or pervert true friendship (1160a30-1161b10). It would seem that 
the kind of friendship that holds states together can only be that of use or pleas-
ure. 
Yet it may be that such a suggestion is to take Aristotle's distinction between 
the three kinds of friendship too seriously; or perhaps put more accurately, Aris-
totle's account of true friendship is more complex than his initial distinction be-
tween the three kinds of friendship suggests. For, as he says, 
it seems that friendship and the just deal with the same objects and 
involve the same persons. For there seems to be a notion of what is just 
in every community, and friendship seems to be involved as well. Men 
address as friends their fellow travelers on a voyage, their fellow 
soldiers, and similarly also those who are associated with them in other 
kinds of community. Friendship is present to the extent that men share 
something in common, for that is also the extent to which they share a 
view of what is just. And the proverb "friends hold in common what 
they have" is correct, for friendship consists in community (1159b25-30). 
Yet it would be unjust to Aristotle's account to fasten on the contention that 
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friendship is present insofar as people share something in common, in the inter-
est of defending him from a far too narrow treatment of friendship. It makes all 
the difference what it is they share in common. In this respect the issue of the 
possibility of true friendship is not unlike the question of the kind of constancy 
necessary for our becoming virtuous. Behind Aristotle's concern to limit true 
friendship to a few relations is to find a basis for friendship that can insure its 
stability. 
That is why friendship requires equality between the friends. Such equality is 
not the same kind as that pertaining to matters of justice, that is, proportionate 
or quantitative equality, but rather is that established by virtue. 
Friendship is equality and likeness, and especially the likeness of those 
who are similar in virtue. Because they are steadfast in themselves, they 
are also steadfast toward one another; they neither request nor render 
any service that is base. On the contrary, one might even say that they 
prevent base services; for what characterizes good men is that they 
neither go wrong themselves nor let their friends do so. Bad people, on 
the other hand, do not have the element of constancy, for they do not 
remain similar even to themselves (1159b4-12). 
Thus, contrary to popular impressions, Aristotle does not assume that people 
must be strictly equal in status, power or position to be friends. Certainly he as-
sumes that friendship between slave and free, man and woman, citizen and ruler 
are difficult, but they are not impossible since equality is that secured on the ba-
sis of virtue.4 In a sense, therefore, friendship is not determined by the political, 
but friendship determines the political insofar as it is the purpose of good poli-
tics to make the life of virtue possible. Thus Aristotle observes sadly that in most 
states "each man lives as he pleases, dealing out law to his children and his wife 
as the Cyclopes do. Now the best thing would be to make the correct care of 
these matters a common concern. But if the community neglects them, it would 
seem to be incumbent upon every man to help his children and friends attain 
virtue. This he will be capable of doing, or at least intend to do" (1180a25-31). 
Thus friendship becomes for Aristotle his account of a true polity in the absence 
of any society ordered by a just constitution.5 
For Aristotle, our task is not to become virtuous, thus establishing the kind of 
equality necessary for friendship and then to seek out friends. Rather, friendship 
itself is an activity necessary for us to acquire the kind of steadfastness necessary 
for our being true friends. True friendship is, therefore, not some ideal that ac-
tual friendships never achieve, but rather true friendship is a process that makes 
possible our becoming virtuous in a manner that transforms ourselves and our 
friendship. I suspect that is why Aristotle is so tolerant of the lesser forms of 
friendship. They at least have the potential of putting us on the road to virtue. 
Equality is not a means lo friendship, but rather friendship makes possible a 
kind of equality between good people. It is through friendship that we are fur-
ther initiated into activity befitting virtue as we learn to be faithful to self 
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through being faithful to another. Social and personal inequalities can be made 
part of the "incidental" aspects of our existence through friendship as good men 
are made through participation in a common activity which is worthwhile in and 
of itself. That is why ''when friendship is based on character, it does last, because 
it is friendship for its own sake, (in which each partner loves his friend for what 
he is)" (1164all-13). 
By calling friendship an activity, Aristotle means something as concrete as his 
account of the various virtues. Just as a virtue is not some means to an end, but 
is a skill necessary for people of character, so friendship is a skill that requires 
concrete expression if we are to benefit from it. Thus, while it is not impossible 
for friendships to exist when friends are absent from one another, if the absence 
lasts for a long time it can be the end of friendship. "For nothing characterizes 
friends as much as living in each other's company. Material advantage is desired 
by those who stand in need, but company is something which is wanted even by 
men who are supremely happy, for they are the least suited to live in isolation" 
(1157b19-20). 
In order to understand Aristotle's account of friendship it is crucial to see that 
he is insisting that friendship is not just based on virtue, it is a virtue. Certainly 
friends must share something in common, but the problem with many kinds of 
friendship is that what is held in common is not lasting, so that when the project 
or trip is over so is the friendship. In contrast, Aristotle is insisting that what 
friends have in common is a certain kind of friendship that is only possible be-
cause of the kind of character they have. Friendship is both a characteristic and 
activity by which the agents become good through the activity itself (1168a5-7). 
Thus in loving a friend we also learn to love our own good. 
For when a good man becomes a friend he becomes a good to the 
person whose friend he is. Thus, each partner both loves his own good 
and makes an equal return in the good he wishes for his partner and in 
the pleasure he gives him. Now friendship is said to be equality, and 
both those qualities inhere in the relationship between good men 
(1157b34-40). 
Even though friendship is a relation, Aristotle does not assume that it is only 
possible in the presence of another. Indeed for us to be people capable of enjoy-
ing true friendship, we must be friends with ourselves. For as Aristotle suggests, 
we count as a friend: 
(1) a person who wishes for and does what is good or what appears to 
him to be good for his friend's sake; or (2) a person who wishes for the 
existence and life of his friend for the friend's sake. We regard as a 
friend also (3) a person who spends his time in our company and (4) 
whose desires are the same as ours, or (5) a person who shares sorrow 
and joy with his friend. A good man has all these feelings in relation to 
himself, (1166al-10) 
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and thus, it makes perfect sense to suggest that we can be a friend to ourselves. 
Indeed the matter must be put more strongly, for we not only can be a friend 
to ourselves, if we are people of character we must be our "own best friend and 
should have the greatest affection for himself' (1168b9). If we are not capable of 
being our own best friend we will lack exactly the constancy necessary to be men 
of character and thus cannot rightly be friends with others. That is why a wicked 
man cannot be a friend even of themselves because they have committed many 
crimes and run away from their lives. They seek the company of others with 
whom they can spend their days, but they avoid their own company as they are 
incapable of remembering their past and they fear their future (1166b10-25). In 
effect, they lack the means to see and have continuity between what they are and 
what they do. Friendship with ourselves makes constancy possible. 
Therefore there can be no tension between our love for others and ourselves.6 
If we love ourselves rightly, that is as people of virtue, then we will rightly love 
others. As good people we should love ourselves, for such love is not the de-
based form of egoism that does everything for its own sake. The good person, 
therefore, will "wish to spend time with himself, for he does so with pleasure. 
The memory of his achievements gives him delight, and his hopes for the future 
are good" (1166a24). By being a friend with another, we are in fact friends with 
ourselves, since our "friend really is another self' (1.166a31). 
There is no doubt much wisdom in Aristotle's account of the necessity that we 
be friends with ourselves. Yet there are two problems that are not easily re-
solved. If loving another is but a form of self-love, then can we be said to be 
genuinely loving another as another? Aristotle is rightly concerned to provide an 
account of the moral prerequisites for friendship that make friendship endure 
across time and in the face of fortune. In many ways it is the same kind of prob-
lem of the kind of stability of self necessary to be a person of character. To sup-
ply such stability be wants to anchor friendship in a similar love of similar vir-
tue--friendship, like virtue, becomes an activity that needs no reason to be. But 
as a result we miss any sense of what we think crucial to friendship--namely, 
learning to value another not because they are like us but because they are dif-
ferent from us. 
This obviously has much to do with the issue I raised at the beginning con-
cerning the necessity of friendship for self-knowledge that is crucial for our being 
virtuous. I think the above analysis has supported that contention, but there is 
still a question whether Aristotle has gone far enough. For if we need friends to 
know ourselves, how can we know what we are if there are no interesting differ-
ences between us and our friends? I suspect this problem relates to Aristotle's 
continuing Platonic assumption that there is a unity to the virtues, thus people of 
character will, insofar as they are moral, be the same. But if the virtues are ca-
pable of quite different arrangements within any one life, or if they may even 
conflict, then it seems that our friend may be quite different than we are. More-
over, such difference is not a sign of moral failure, but necessary if we are to 
know what we are.7 
The second problem is but a form of the problem of difference between 
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fr iends. Aristotle rightly sees that it is crucial that friends should be able to rely 
on one another--1 can trust you to be what you are. But he requires such a strong 
account of self-sufficiency in order to sustain trust that he comes close to deny-
ing the kind of vulnerability and mutuality we think necessary for friendship.8 
For example, Aristotle says people of virtue need friends because the "function 
of a friend is to do good rather than to be treated well, if the performance of 
good deeds is the mark of a good man and of excellence, and if it is nobler to do 
good to a friend than to a stranger, then a man of high moral standards will need 
people to whom he can do good" (1169b10-13). Or again he says that "friendship 
appears to consist in giving rather than in receiving affection" (1159a26). 
His insistence on this point extends well beyond the doing of good deeds for 
our friend, however, as he suggests that a noble man prefers friends present dur-
ing good, rather than bad, fortune. He does so because it is painful to see our 
friends "pained by our misfortunes, for everyone tries to avoid being the cause of 
a friend's pain. For that reason, manly natures take scrupulous care not to let 
their friends share their pain" (ll7lb5-6). Whereas in good fortune, 
the presence of friends brings with it a pleasant way of passing one's 
time and the pleasant thought that they are pleased by the good we are 
enjoying. This is the reason for thinking that we ought to be eager to 
invite our friends to share our good fortunes, since it is noble to do 
good, and to be reluctant to ask our friend to share our misfortune, 
since one should let others participate as little as possible in what is evil. 
We should invite our friends to come to our side chiefly when a little 
trouble on their part will mean great benefit to us (ll7lbl4-20). 
We, thus, seem to have returned to Aristotle's "high-minded man" who wel-
comes great risks because he desires to do good, but is ashamed to accept a 
good turn. He is so because by doing good he is able to put the other in his debt 
while providing himself with an added benefit (1124b7-18). There is much to be 
said for Aristotle's realism as he is no doubt correct that many of our friendships 
have such a character. But there seems to be something deeply wrong with such 
realism as it runs counter to Aristotle's central contention about the nature of 
friendship. For if the person of character can only be a friend by being "strong," 
he or she seems to lack the means to share in the common activity Aristotle says 
is essential to friendship. 
John Cooper argues, however, that Aristotle's account of friendship inher-
ently presupposes human vulnerability. Cooper characterizes Aristotle's conten-
tion " that to know the goodness of one's life, which he reasonably assumes to be 
a necessary condition of flourishing, one needs to have intimate fr iends whose 
lives are similarly good, since one is better able to reach a sound and secure esti-
mate of the quality of life when it is not one's own."9 Thus friendship is required 
because each of us left to our own devices cannot reach a secure estimate of our 
own moral character, 
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nor by ourselves can we find our lives continuously interesting and 
enjoyable, because the sense of the value of the activities that make 
them up is not within the individual's power to bestow. The sense of 
one's own worth is, for human beings, a group accomplishment. Hence 
we need each other because as individuals we are not sufficient--
psychologically sufficient--to sustain our own lives.10 
While I think Cooper is certainly right, he fails to address the main issue. The 
question is not whether we need friends because we are vulnerable, but whether 
we should not be the kind of people who will the presence of other people in a 
manner that makes us vulnerable to their presence. Aristotle wants to protect us 
and our friendship against the threat of fortune, time and change. He thus 
searches for the means to insure the stability of friendship by insuring that 
friends are in a sense "self-contained," but in the process friends lose exactly 
that which is necessary for friendship--the ability to accept not just gifts from our 
friend but friendship itself as a gift. 
FRIENDSHIP IN THEOWGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In order to bring all this to a close, as well as to suggest what theological im-
plications all this may have, I want to call your attention to another book on 
friendship--namely the Gospel of John. I think it is no accident that one of the 
climactic passages of John consists of Jesus admonishing the disciples in this 
manner, 
If you abide in me, and my words abide in you, ask whatever you will, 
and it shall be done for you. By this my Father is glorified, that you bear 
much fruit, and so prove to be my disciples. As the Father has loved me, 
so have I loved you; abide in my love. If you keep my commandments, 
you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father's 
commandments and abide in his love. These things I have spoken to 
you, that my joy may be in you, and that your joy may be full. This is my 
commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you. Greater 
love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. 
You are my friends if you do what I command you. No longer do I call 
you servants, for the servant does not know what his master is doing; 
but I have called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I 
have made known to you. You did not choose me, but I chose you and 
appointed you that you should go and bear fruit and that your fruit 
should abide; so that whatever you ask the Father in my name, he may 
give it to you. This I command you, to love one another" (John 15:7-17). 
It is interesting that Jesus does not ask the disciples to be friends, but he com-
iands them to be friends. By doing so He does not deny the affective nature of 
>Ve, but indicates the kind of friendship He has in mind is of a different order 
ian the normal run of things. It is a friendship made possible because through 
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His life a new order has come into being. An order that makes friendship pos-
sible not because we are alike, but because we are different. To learn to follow 
Jesus is the way we become friends of God. But what an extraordinary idea--for 
on what basis could it ever be possible for us to be God's friend? 
It would seem that such friendship is possible only because God refuses to let 
our limitations determine His life. Thus we are told, 
For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever 
believes in him should not perish but have eternal life. For God sent the 
Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world might 
be saved through him. He who believes in him is not condemned; he 
who does not believe is condemned already, because he has not believed 
in the name of the only Son of God (John 3:16-18). 
That is why Jesus speaks of giving us a new commandment even though on 
the surface it seems anything but new. We have known all along that we should 
love one another. Something like love, after all, is commended by many cultures 
and moral codes. But the love that is generally recommended is vastly different 
than the love that Jesus commands. The love he commands is "as I have loved 
you," that we can thus "love one another." For by this "all men will know that 
you are my disciples, if you have love for one another" (John 13:34-35). 
But how has Jesus loved us? He has loved us quite simply by making us His 
friends. He has done this because, unlike servants who do not know what the 
master is doing, He has made known to us all that the Father has willed. In ef-
fect, He has made us capable of friendship because He has made us agents in an 
ongoing history. He has made us agents because He bas patiently forced us to 
learn to see the truth by transforming us to see a God who would love unre-
lentingly, even to having His son die that His kingdom might be a reality. Such 
love does not remove the difference between us and God, but rather makes our 
difference contribute to rather than prevent our friendship. 
As we have seen, this is no easy lesson for us to learn. We prefer to be friends 
with a God who bears a closer resemblance to Aristotle's "high-minded man"--
that is, a God who is always ready to help, to comfort, to love, but is never there 
to be helped, to be loved, or need our friendship. We want a God sufficient to 
Himself so that He needs no other friends than Himself. But that is not the kind 
of God we find through Jesus' life and death. Rather we find a God who gra-
ciously has provided us a place within His own life--a place that He refuses to 
revoke. 
Thus Jesus unashamedly requires that we not only learn to love one another, 
but we should learn to love Him and love Him rightly (John 14:28). Leaming to 
love God is the condition for our learning to love one another, for our learning 
to be friends. To be sure, our fr iendship with Jesus is not determined on our 
terms as we did not choose Him but rather He chose us. Nonetheless, we are 
thus given the privilege of loving God by continuing in the life initiated by Jesus. 
Friendship is no less central to the moral life for John than for Aristotle. But 
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it is a friendship that is constant because He who has made us His friends is true 
in a way we can never be. Our constancy is not the result of our will, but rather 
because we and others find ourselves through participation in a common activity 
that makes us faithful both to ourselves and the other. That activity is not, as it 
almost seems to be in Aristotle, mutual enjoyment as an end in itself, but rather 
it is the activity of a task which we have been given. That task is nothing less 
than to participate in a new way of life made possible by the life of this man, 
Jesus of Nazareth. 
The constancy necessary for friendship is transformed in the light of this task. 
It is not necessary to make the self impervious to the threats that accompany our 
love of another. Because our character is the result of a transformation that has 
been made possible by a gift, we are able to risk being present to others without 
feeling the need of protection. The constancy that Aristotle quite rightly sees as 
necessary for friendship turns out to be possible only if we are able through our 
lives to point to a source outside our lives that makes it possible. Or, put more 
directly, the constancy of our character is not finally "ours," but is the result of a 
relation that would be impossible without the willingness of God to always be 
there. 
That is why, as Christians, we can risk the kind of partiality required by 
friendship. Friendship is not just an instance of some more universal love, it is 
the attention and regard for another precisely as they are other, as they are dif-
ferent, from ourselves. We can take the risk of such love because we are called 
to imitate the partiality of God's love for us as shown through His son. As Helen 
Oppenheimer has contended, 
" Impartiality'' is not a divine virtue, but a human expedient to make up 
for the limits of our concern on the one hand and the corruptibility of 
our affections on the other. If we find ourselves neglecting, or spoiling, 
or abusing, we need to be more even-handed and partiality becomes a 
vice; but the august partiality of God is a taking hold of the special 
character of each creature as uniquely significant.11 
In short, God is able to love each creature as a friend without His love being 
diminished for any other creature. It is through our friendships formed by Christ 
that the Christian learns to participate in that love. 
Friendship is not only a possibility but a necessity for Christians because we 
are an eschatological people that live by hope. That life is a journey is something 
that Aristotle sensed in his account of the life of happiness, virtue and friendship. 
But for Christians, life is not just a journey, but a journey of a very particular 
kind in which we are invited to be participants in a community of friends formed 
)y the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. Such friends do not just love one an-
)ther as mirror images of their own virtue, but rather they love one another in 
::Jod. Friendship is a manifestation of hope, therefore, as hope but names the 
ind of journey to which Christians have been called that makes possible the 
isks of friendship. 
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As Aristotle saw clearly, friendship is a fragile business. We often enter into 
relations with one another before we can have the knowledge that the other is 
capable of being the kind of person suited to being a friend. This means, as 
Gilbert Meilaender says, "We may commit ourselves to persons for whom our 
regard may fade. Yet, in thus committing ourselves to another person, we create 
in that friend a set of expectations, needs and loyalties which cannot simply be 
set aside without pain and grief."U That is why Aristotle says even if we find that 
a friend we thought was good is not, we should not break off the friendship 
quickly if we think there is a chance to reform him (1165b12-20). 
But for Christians, friendship, even with the enemy, must at least be offered 
as we have the basis to hope that such an off er can be used by God to create a 
new friend. We know that we may be disappointed in our friends, or even worse, 
we may disappoint a friend; but we also know that we are participants in a jour-
ney that can sustain us through our disappointments and hurts. We have been 
commanded to be friends with one another, that even though we are strangers to 
one another, friendship is possible. That is the way we bear fruit, for in that way 
the world can see how a people love one another and, even more, how happy 
that makes us.13 
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